Abstract-This paper investigated Information Technology (IT) security on the email systems at three selected Western Australian (WA) local government councils. The study's testing and analysis was used and based on several industries and national benchmarking standards for investigated the email system security at all three selected councils. The scope of the analysis included the email threats, architecture, the infrastructure devices, port scanning and vulnerabilities on the email server, email spoofing and email vendor auditing. There were some common problems in all three selected councils that maybe applied in other contexts. In addition, the study aims to provide an email security framework which can be easily adopted and is flexible enough for use in any city councils or other organizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic mail (email) is a common and widely used Internet related technology throughout individuals, industry and government organizations such as WA's local government councils. Other Internet related technologies that are being used in these councils, are Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), Geographic Information System (GIS), Global Position System (GPS) and online services systems. These technologies are used to provide both data and voice services to the councils, communities and their residents. Specialist online services such as web information, library, Customer Relationship Management (CRM) and payment systems are also being provided by the WA's councils to its residents and the public.
A major concern of all the selected WA's councils in the provision of these Internet services is the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) security system. The ICT security imperative includes both confidentiality and privacy of users' information over the Internet especially in relation to the online payments, online library and email systems.
This paper aims to investigate the IT security of the email system which is currently deployed at the selected WA councils, in order to investigate whether the system has been implemented securely in a way that meets national and international security standards. A proposed email security framework was deployed in incorporated with several security auditing tools, standards for the testing and analysis purposes.
Three WA local government councils were selected based on their willingness to provide sufficient and relevant data for testing and analysis. Reciprocally, this study provided feedback and security enhancement recommendations to the selected councils. The tests were collected on a real-time basis for all three selected councils. In addition, the testing analysis and implementation framework, results findings and discussions were also included as report submissions to the individual councils for which the study was undertaken.
II. METHODOLOGY
This section is divided into two subsections which are email vulnerabilities and implementation framework.
A. Email vulnerabilities
The majority of email users are unaware of and resistant to the use of email encryption or security tools to secure their email messages [1] . This can leave email vulnerable to preventable malicious attacks. There are also some common threats and attack techniques associated with the email system which are frequently used by intruders as summarized in Table 1 . 
Attacking techniques

Description of the techniques
Email bomber
Massive emails generated which can be the same or different messages from an individual sender or a group of senders.
Email spamming Any unwanted advertisements for services or products which were included in an email message.
Email sniffing and spoofing
A way of intercepting email traffic using a network sniffer tool which allows the attacker to capture all the email contents.
Email scam Fraud or unwanted email that usually claims the prospect of a bargain or something for nothing.
Email phishing Emails which were created to collect (phish) personal information (identity theft) such as usernames, passwords, credit card and bank account.
Email borne viruses
Emails that have an attached virus, worm or Trojan.
Buffer overflows By sending a long HELO command or long email names in MAIL or RCPT commands to the target email server can create a buffer overflow and possibly interrupt the email system [2] .
DoS
This attack may crash or destabilize the target email server by attempting to open multiple connections to the server (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) flooding).
Third-party mail relay
Or open relay is a target email server which receives email from an unknown sender. Then sending it on to recipient(s) which are not users of the email system [3] .
B. Implementation framework
The implementation framework was based on the level of security of the council's email system. There were various testing techniques which were adapted for use as components within this framework. The implementation framework for the testing of the security of the email system consisted of five stages, which included (1) network surveying; (2) internetwork infrastructure review; (3) services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability detection of the email system servers; (4) spoofing testing and vendor security benchmarking; and (5) email system security policy review. See Fig.1 for more details. Stage1: The network surveying stage was used to collect information on the council's email system through the use of the following two artifacts:
• Overall network diagram for the internetwork linkages,including the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) infrastructure connectivity of the email system;and • Configuration codes and device specifications of all internetworking devices such as the Internet border router, the Internet firewall(s) , the external /DMZ/ internal switch(s),the reverse proxy server and the related email system. In addition, in this stage the overall email system architecture including its internetwork infrastructure was also reviewed.
Stage 2: The internetwork infrastructure devices review was used to review the related specification and configuration codes as part of the data collection of the internetwork infrastructure devices of the email system of the three selected councils. The internetwork infrastructure devices consisted of the Internet border router, the Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion Prevention System (IDS/IPS), the firewall(s), the DMZ switch(s) and the reverse proxy server (Council C only).
Stage 3: In this stage, both Network Mapper (NMAP) [7] and GFI LANguard [8] network scanning tools were used for scanning the council's email system (email server and in-house spam blocker(s)). NMAP with GUI standard (open source Zenmap version 5.0) for Windows XP version with slow comprehensive scan option, and GFI LANguard version 9.0 with the full scan option, were run for all three testing steps (services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerabilities testing), at all of the three selected councils.
Stage 4: This testing stage involved two steps which included the email spoofing testing and the email vendor security auditing as follows:
• Email spoofing testing which was adapted from the OSSTMM 2.2 email spoofing template as a guideline. The purpose of this testing was to test the email server against any spoofing attacks; and • Email vendor security auditing which was specifically modified to suit the email application server system of each selected council. However, the CIS Benchmark for Exchange 2007 for Windows Server 2003 version 1.0 (recommended Security Setting for Exchange Controls template) was modified and used at all three selected councils. This was due to the fact that the Microsoft (MS) Exchange 2007 email server platform was being used in all three selected councils.
Stage 5: The email system security policy review; the intention of this stage was to review the IT security policy in relation to the email system which covered the internetwork architecture and its devices, the email server(s), the authorization, the authentication and the accounting of the email system in each of the selected councils.
III. CURRENT EMAIL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND EMAIL PROTOCOLS
A. Council A Council A's email system has one MS Exchange 2007 email server which was located in the council's internal network and one appliance Symantec Mail Security Suite 5.0 spam blocker server which was located in the council's DMZ network. The internetwork infrastructure consists of a Cisco 2811 Internet border router, one Cisco ASA (5520) firewall and three Cisco Catalyst 3650SM switches. The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) feature on the Internet border router has been disabled. Furthermore, the IPS features on the firewall was also disabled due to past bad experiences in using the IPS. Staff relayed to the researchers that the IPS failed continuously when activated and was difficult to manage given the resources they had. The firewall also performs Network Address Translation (NAT) as well as Port Address Translation (PAT). Each of the three switches provides the internetwork, DMZ and internal network connectivity respectively. See Fig. 2 for more details. B. Council B Council B's email system consists of one MS Exchange 2007 email server, and two Cisco IronPort C150 spam blocker servers. The email server was located in the council's internal network while the two spam blockers were in the DMZ area. Council B's email server was also configured its email application software as a simple-architecture similar to Council A. Additionally, each of the two spam blocker appliances has two network interfaces for splitting between incoming and outgoing email traffics. The two spam blocker appliances run concurrently as part of a redundancy strategy (active and standby modes). (UTM-1 272) and one Cisco Catalyst 3750G switch. Similarly to Council A, Council B's the IDS feature of the Internet border router was disabled. Both the firewalls have no existing IPS feature; however, the firewalls can be upgraded by a paid add-on IPS feature. Both NAT and PAT are also performed at the firewalls. The switch serves all the internetwork, DMZ and internal network connectivity. See Fig. 3 for more details. C. Council C Council C's email system consists of one MS Exchange 2007 email server and one Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA) 2006 reverse proxy server which are located in the internal network and the DMZ network respectively. Similarly to both Councils A and B, the email application software of Council C's email server is also configured as a simple-architecture. The reverse proxy server is used with the email server for webmail purpose. Both the servers are communicated securely via Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 443.
Council C uses an external spam blocker service for scanning unwanted spam email. Incoming cleaned email will pass through Council C's email server whereas outgoing email traffic will forward to the external spam blocker service to inspect and clean any potential spam or virus before forward the cleaned email to the recipients.
There was no Internet border router deployed at internetwork infrastructure of Council C. The infrastructure consisted of two Juniper (SSG-350M) firewalls and one HP (E5412zl) switch. Both the two firewalls act as a main filtering for all incoming and outgoing network traffics. They also perform NAT and PAT. Both the firewalls are connected and configured as redundancy which one of the firewall operates in active mode and the other operates in a standby mode. In addition, the switch provides connectivity for all the internetwork, the DMZ as well as the internal networks. The switch also acts as an internal central core switch which connects to all the council's access desktop switches. See Fig.  4 for more details. 
D. Email protocols
Currently SMTP and Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) are used for standard email and webmail respectively at all three selected councils. However, other related email protocols such as Post Office Protocol (POP3) and Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) were not used at any of the three selected councils.
The email systems of both Councils A and B are allowed webmail (HTTPS) traffic get through their email infrastructures directly without any inspection to their email servers which are located in their internal networks. Differently, the email system of Council C uses its firewalls to inspect the webmail traffic before forward to its reverse proxy server and the email server respectively.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS FINDING
Data was collected, analyzed and tested using the five stages of the implementation framework as described in Section 2. The results and findings of all the five stages on each the email systems are displayed in a table format for each stage for simplicity.
Stage 1: Network surveying -The email related technical network documentation was gathered for each of the selected councils. They were found to be only partly updated. The MS Exchange 2007 email server was deployed as part of a single server architecture which was not according to the best practice recommendations for larger organizations [9] , [10] at all three selected councils.
Stage 2: Internetwork infrastructure reviews Stage 3:Auditing review of the email servers of the three selected councils (services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability detection). As per recommendations to best practice, there were inadequate settings, configurations and implementations of the related email system devices in all five testing stages based on the results presented earlier. These shortcomings are a possible cause of concern for potential risks in the three selected WA council's email systems.
With respect to these inadequacies in the operation of the related email system devices, there were six main factors uncovered in this study. They include (1) the lack of IT security standards awareness of industrial best practices by staff, (2) inadequate specific knowledge, (3) inefficient communication between the staff, (4) limited IT training for staff as a result of limited budget, (5) staff not having enough time for task completion and (6) reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects.
1) The lack of IT security standards awareness of industrial best practices by staff: There were two audits conducted which included several discussions and meetings for each of the selected councils. For example, there was no standalone DMZ switch deployed at both Councils B and C. In addition, the following lists summarizes the overall common findings which related to the first factor from the three selected councils:
• There was no Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link deployed at all selected councils; and • The architectural design of the email servers was not in line with the MS Exchange 2007 recommendations of best practices [9] , [10] at all selected councils.
The can be considered of lacks of knowledge and should be resolved by providing further training to their IT operation staff.
2) Inadequate domain or service specific knowledge:
There was evidence of missed and inadequate configuration of the Internet border router's ACL, the DMZ switch's codes, the firewall rules, the unnecessary ports and the services installed on the email servers at all three selected councils. This was due to the fact that the staff were not well versed in these technical areas for the correct implementation. See Tables 1 to 5 for more details. 3) Inefficient communication between the IT staff: It was evident that the firewalls for the email servers were inadequately configured. For example, wrong port numbers were assigned as a result of oral miscommunication between the IT staff at all three selected councils. In addition, the lack of a change management process at all three selected councils also contributed to the potential for inefficient communication between the IT staff.
4) Limited IT training for staff as a result of a limited training budget: There were limited IT training budgets allocated at all three selected councils. Typically, the IT administrator was able to attend only one or less related IT training course per year. This occurred at all three selected councils over the past five years. This training policy may be directly attributed to insufficient knowledge for managing the email system. In addition, all the IT administrators at all selected councils have never attended specific industry or equivalent training in both firewall and MS Exchange 2007 related courses.
5) Insufficient time for task completion by the IT staff: At all three selected councils, the IT staff had several duties and diverse tasks which sometimes resulted in some of the tasks being continuously left incomplete or unattended. Additionally, there was also no time left for proper documentation at all three councils as presented in Stage 1.
6) Reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects: The three selected councils reliance on outsourcing to solve the expertise problem may be a possible disadvantage in terms of a lack of knowledge transfer for the IT staff. This is evidenced by the fact that the firewall systems at all three selected councils were implemented by external consultants. In addition, the email servers (MS Exchange 2007) at all three selected councils were also deployed by external consultants. Consequently, historical records of implementation and maintenance were deficient and not readily available. This point out that there was poor contract management by all the three selected councils.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The results from the testing and analysis of these three selected councils have shown that the implementation framework can be used for auditing as well as testing email infrastructure security particularly in the similar structure, architecture or environment. As previously outlined there were many common points of vulnerability or security issues uncovered as a result of the research. Many of the issues uncovered were not just purely technological in focus. In fact, many of the serious issues revolved around poor process and human factor issues that contributed to a poor security position for example the lack of resources for training and education. This was a major issue and one that all councils can readily address and get a better standard of service with minimal financial outlay.
There were also significant issues with the technical security and as you would expect many of these were easy to fix and gave the councils a stronger security posture with minimal cost. The framework also uncovered some unforeseen issues with configuration and security of the systems tested. As a result of this study, the implementation framework, presented here can be used to audit an email system, particularly in Windows server environment and one deploying MS Exchange 2007.
It is also possible for this framework to be adopted by any councils or organizations with similar architectures and get discernible outcomes. The adoption of the framework may be used as a guideline in auditing or testing the security of their email system provided that it is in compliance with their existing ICT policies. Furthermore, the framework may also be used as a basis for documentation of their email system.
